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Newton: Protecting Liberty Through Checks and Balances: Federal Maritime

PROTECTING LIBERTY THROUGH CHECKS
AND BALANCES: FEDERAL MARITIME
COMMISSION V. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE
PORTS A UTHORITY
1.

INTRODUCTION

When the thirteen original colonies formed "a more perfect

Union"' by ratifying the Constitution of the United States, many
questions were left unanswered as to the exact delineation of power
between the federal government and the states. One such enigma
was whether the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity
would continue to bar suits by private individuals against states.
The original 1787 draft of the Constitution did not expressly

address the subject.2 The Eleventh Amendment, which was ratified
by the requisite number of states in 1798, constitutionally protected
states from some such suits. The amendment reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment appears to restrict the
Article III grant of diversity jurisdiction to federal courts4 or, at the
most, to give states a complete defense in diversity suits brought by
private parties.' Beginning with Hans v. Louisiana6 in 1890, this

1. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
2. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 104 (1996).

3. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.3, 398 (3d ed. 1999);
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 ("(Tlhe text of the Amendment would appear to restrict
only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts ....).
5. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.

139, 145 (1993) (disagreeing with the view that the Eleventh Amendment is merely a
defense to liability and stating that it is only a jurisdictional requirement). But see
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 7.3, at 399 (explaining that if Eleventh Amendment
immunity is a restriction on subject matterjurisdiction, then it should not be waivable).
Sovereign immunity might also be viewed as a third type of entity-an immunity that
is waivable by statute but that neither deprives a federal court ofjurisdiction nor must
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Amendment has been read broadly. FederalMaritime Commission
v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,7 which extends sovereign
immunity to adjudications in federal administrative agencies, is a
recent example in this line of cases.
This Note discusses Federal Maritime Commission and its
historical context. It also explores the deeply divided United States
Supreme Court's reasons for refusing to abrogate sovereign
immunity despite its unanimous agreement that the literal text of
the Eleventh Amendment could not support its holding. Part II of
this Note reviews the historical background of the Eleventh
Amendment and the principle of sovereign immunity, describing
the case law history. Part III summarizes the positions of the widely
divergent majority and dissenting opinions. Finally, Part IV
analyzes these different opinions and attempts to provide a rationale
for FederalMaritime Commission's holding. This Note concludes
that the Court's decision can be reconciled with the text of the U.S.
Constitution and is a significant contribution to the preservation of
our national liberty.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Eleventh Amendment History

The history of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has been
discussed at length in several recent United States Supreme Court
cases and cannot be understood outside of its historical context.8
The Eleventh Amendment is related to, but not coterminous with,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 9 Sovereign immunity predates
the founding of the United States and is derived from the English
common law.'" The rationale behind sovereign immunity was that a
court could not establish jurisdiction over the king because it was
from him that a court derived its authority." The United States's

be raised as a complete defense by a state's attorney general.

6. 134 U.S. I (1890) (extending sovereign immunity to suits against a state by
one of its own citizens).
7. 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002).

8.

CHEMERINSKY,

supranote 4, at § 7.2, 390. See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.

706, 722-24 (1999) (adopting the view that sovereign immunity derives from the

history and structure of the Constitution).
9. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
10. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir.
2001).

II. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23435 (The University of Chicago Press 1979) (1765).
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founding generation universally accepted this concept, 2 and it
remains true today that a citizen may not sue the federal
government without its consent."l
The States also claimed protection under this concept following
the revolution.' 4 During the ratification debates of the Constitution,
several of our most prominent leaders discussed sovereign
immunity's place in the new federal republic. 5 The most famous of
these passages is found in THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, in which
Alexander Hamilton explained:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent. This is the general sense and the general
practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of
the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the
government of every State in the Union. 6
James Madison and John Marshall also spoke unequivocally on
the importance and universal acceptance of sovereign immunity. 7
Thus, sovereign immunity was well established at the time the
States ratified the Constitution.' However, other than granting
jurisdiction to federal courts in Article III, the Constitution did not
address sovereign immunity.19 Consequently, when the issue of
state sovereign immunity came before the U.S. Supreme Court in
1793,20 a four-member majority saw no place for the monarchical
concept in a government "deriving its just powers from the consent
of the governed."'" The Court held that Article III "vests a

12. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715-18; S.C. State PortsAuth., 243 F.3d at 167; THE
FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

13. See Franconia Assoc. v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 1993, 2001 (2002).
14. See S.C. State Ports Auth., 243 F.3d at 168-69; see also Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934) (explaining that states possess attributes of
sovereignty and may not be sued without their consent unless there has been a
surrender under the Constitution).

15. Compare Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716-19 (quoting Alexander
Hamilton and other prominent founders in support of sovereign immunity), with id. at
772-81 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting James Wilson and others in opposition to
sovereign immunity).
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 12, at 487 (emphasis in original).
17. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 717-18.
18. Id. at 715.
19. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending the federal judicial power to certain
controversies to which states are parties).
20. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
21. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see, e.g.,
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 455 (asserting that sovereign immunity is derived from
despotic notions of kingship in England, whereas the United States Constitution is
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jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over a State, as a defendant, at the
22
suit of a private citizen of another State.
Only Justice Iredell dissented. Citing numerous authorities
from the English common law, he contended that the preexisting
rule was that a citizen may petition a sovereign for redress, but may
not demand relief from a sovereign in one of its courts. 3 Secondly,
Justice Iredell noted that no provision in the Constitution addressed
the doctrine or attempted to limit it.24 He concluded that, because
nothing had taken sovereign immunity from the states, they must
25
continue to have it.
The majority holding seemed to have taken the country by
surprise. In fact, courts have noted that Chisholm v. Georgia "fell
upon the country with a profound shock. ''26 A bill to amend the
Constitution was introduced in the House of Representatives the
day after the Court released the opinion,27 and the requisite number
of states ratified the Eleventh Amendment within a year. 2' The mere
fact of its passage is evidence that American voters of the time
strongly supported the concept of sovereign immunity.29
There is considerable debate over the exact intent and effect of
the Eleventh Amendment.3" As discussed above, the text itself
appears to be limited in scope." Consequently, Justice Souter
argued that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to prohibit suits
brought under the citizen-state diversity clauses of Article III,
which name a state as a defendant, but not to bar federal question
jurisdiction over private suits against states.32
based on the principal that"a State [is] considered as subordinate to the people... [b]ut
[]every thing else [is] subordinate to the State").
22. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 420.
23. Id. at 440-45.
24. Id. at 449-50.
25. Id. at 449.
26. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1870 (2002)
(quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720 (1999)).
27. Alden, 527 U.S. at 721.
28. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at § 7.2 (discussing the history of the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment).
29. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 743.
30. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 109-10 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment should be read to either "repeal [] the
Citizen-State Diversity Clauses of Article III for all cases in which the State appears as
a defendant," or to "strip[] the federal courts ofjurisdiction in any case in which a state
defendant is sued by a citizen not its own, even ifjurisdiction might otherwise rest on
the existence of a federal question in the suit"); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4,
at § 7.3 (listing three competing theories for interpreting the Eleventh Amendment).
31. See supra notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
32. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 109-11 & n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting). Article III,
Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides, in part, that "[tihejudicial Power
shall extend to ... Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State;
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Similarly, the Eleventh Amendment's text only bars suits
against a state by citizens of another state. However, in 1890, the
Court held that sovereign immunity prevented a citizen from suing
his own state without its consent.33 Although the text itself could

not have supported such a result, the Court reasoned that the
Eleventh Amendment was not drafted to define the outer limits of
sovereign immunity, but only to specifically overrule the holding in
Chisholm.34 Citing Alexander Hamilton,35 as well as James
Madison36 and John Marshall, 7 the Hans court held that, because an
action against a sovereign state was non-existent at the time the
Constitution was ratified, it followed that there would have been no
reason for the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment to have made
provisions against this "unheard of' contingency.38 The Court
further noted that, because federal courts are provided with
concurrent jurisdiction with state courts, federal courts could not
have jurisdiction over claims against states barred by sovereign
immunity in state courts. 3 9

The Hans v. Louisiana decision has stirred up nearly as much
controversy as Chisholm and continues to be criticized by some
members of the Court.4" Nevertheless, the Court later held state
sovereign immunity extends to suits by Indian tribes,41 foreign
nations,42 federal corporations,43 admiralty proceedings," suits
exclusively based on federal rights,45 and suits in a state's own
courts 46

The Court has developed a number of exceptions to the
sovereign immunity doctrine. The primary exception derives from
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer47 the Court held

... and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects."
33. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890).
34. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1871
(2002); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 723 (1999) (discussing the history of the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment).
35. Hans, 134 U.S. at 13; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
36. Hans, 134 U.S. at 14.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 18.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 102 (1996) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (arguing that Hans was erroneously decided).
41. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 783 (1991).
42. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934).
43. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 449 (1900).
44. Exparte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
45. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
46. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
47. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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that Congress could abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from
private causes of action based on the enforcement power of Section
5 of the Amendment. 4' However, this exception is narrowly
construed. Congress must clearly state its intention to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in a statute passed pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. 49 Even then, the bar will only be lifted if the cause of
action protects fundamental rights, and there is evidence that the
statute or regulation was created because of widespread violation of
that right."0 The Court has recognized several other exceptions to
sovereign immunity: (1) a state may consent to a lawsuit; 51 (2)
sovereign immunity does not apply to suits brought by the federal
government or other states; 52 (3) sovereign immunity does not
protect municipalities or other units of local government; 3 (4)
certain private suits against state officers for only injunctive or
declaratory relief to remedy an ongoing violation of federal law are
allowed under the Ex parte Young exception;5 4 and (5) sovereign
immunity does not bar actions for money damages against state
officers in their individual capacity for wrongful or unconstitutional
conduct.55
Federal administrative agencies may not sue states without
statutory authority, but the United States Attorney General may
bring an enforcement action against a state under the exception for
suits brought by the federal government.56 In order to qualify as a
suit by the federal government, the United States must "exercise
..political responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State, a
control which is absent from a broad delegation to private persons
to sue nonconsenting States."57
In 1989, a divided U.S. Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., appeared to find a new exception, holding that
48. Id. at 456; see also Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
363-65 (2001) (reaffirming the principle that Congress may abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to its enforcement power of Section 5 of the 14th amendment).
49. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (citing Blatchford v. Native Village ofNoatak,
501 U.S. 775, 786 (1991)).
50. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 (narrowly limiting the circumstances under
which Congress may abrogate pursuant to its power under Section 5 of the 14th
amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82 (2000).
51. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755.
52. Id. (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1934)).
53. Id. at 756.
54. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-60 (1908).
55. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 170 (4th Cir.
2001).
56. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S.Ct. 1864, 1876
(2002) (explaining the process by which the Federal Maritime Commission may
enforce its judgments).
57. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss3/8

6

Newton: Protecting Liberty Through Checks and Balances: Federal Maritime
2003]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to the
Commerce Clause in Article I of the Constitution.58 However, only
four justices held this position, and Justice White, providing the
fifth vote in a concurring opinion, wrote that he only agreed with
the result and not "with much of [the] reasoning."59 At this point, it
appeared that sovereign immunity was all but eviscerated. If
Congress could abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to any of its
Article I powers, then there would seem to be no constitutional
limits on Congress' power to abrogate sovereign immunity.6"
However, five years later, in Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v. Florida,"
the Court overruled Union Gas, holding that the "background
principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of
the suit is an area . . . that is under the exclusive control of the

Federal Government."62 Seminole Tribe has been criticized on the
grounds that it undermines the ability of the federal government to
enforce federal law on states.63 Because the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution empowers the federal government to make laws
that bind the states,' and the Constitution vests power to enforce
federal laws with the executive branch of government,65 it would
seem to follow that the federal government would be able to
respond to private complaints about unlawful state activity by
bringing suit on behalf of the private complainants.66 States remain
subject to federal laws and must comply with regulations passed
pursuant to the Commerce Clause,67 but the Court held in Seminole
Tribe that the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of sovereign
68
immunity act to prevent private enforcement suits against states.
However, neither principle prevents the federal government, itself,
from bringing enforcement actions against nonconsenting states.69

58. 491 U.S. 1(1989).

59. Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring). This case and Justice White's concurrence
was discussed in Seminole Tribe ofFla. v. Florida,517 U.S. 44, 59, 63-64 (1996).

60. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 42 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). This point was noted in Alden, 527 U.S. at 737.
61. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
62. Id.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1883 (2002)

(Breyer, J., dissenting).
67. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754-55 (1999).

68. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 ("Even when the Constitution vests in
Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh

Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
unconsenting States.").
69. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755-56.
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In Alden v. Maine71 the Court held, over Justice Souter's bitter
dissent, that the principle of sovereign immunity also extended to
private suits in state courts.7 The Court found that the sovereign
immunity principle in the Eleventh Amendment derived not only
from the common law tradition but also from the structure and
history of the Constitution.72 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, methodically rejected every argument against state
sovereign immunity and concluded that "history, practice,
precedent, and the structure of the Constitution" conclusively show
that the states were never required to give up their sovereign
immunity in their own courts and that Congress does not have the
power to abrogate it.73 Alden reaffirmed that sovereign immunity,
although derived from common law, is based on constitutional
principles of federalism and state dignity and, thus, extends
constitutional protection to states beyond the literal text of the
Eleventh Amendment.74
B. Case History
It is within this context that the FederalMaritime Commission
parties' litigation ensued. South Carolina Maritime Services
(Maritime Services), a South Carolina corporation," requested
permission on five occasions to berth the cruise ship M/V Tropic
Sea at the South Carolina State Ports Authority's (SCSPA) port
facilities at the Port of Charleston, South Carolina.76 Each time
SCSPA denied the request on the grounds that South Carolina law
prohibited gambling77 and that it was SCSPA's policy to deny
berthing to ships whose "primary purpose was gambling."78
Maritime Services pointed out that Carnival Cruise Lines ships
were allowed to berth even though they offered gambling activities
on the ships.79 SCSPA countered that Carnival Cruise Lines ships

70. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
71. Id. at 754.
72. See id at 741-54 (discussing the structural and historical roots of sovereign
immunity as a constitutional principle).
73. Id. at 754.
74. Id. at 727; see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,669 (1999) (reaffirming the view that sovereign immunity

extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment).
75. Brief for the Federal Maritime Commission at 4, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C.
State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 0 1-46).

76. Id. at 5.
77. Joint Appendix at 18, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct.
1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
78. Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1868.
79. Id.
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were different in that they were equipped for overnight travel."0 In
contrast, the M/V Tropic Sea was not fitted for overnight travel but
only for day "gambling cruises to nowhere."81 SCSPA argued that
the policy was not discriminatory because it only prohibited
berthing to ships whose primary purpose was gambling.82
Maritime Services then filed a complaint with the Federal
Maritime Commission (FMC),83 alleging that SCSPA had violated
the Federal Shipping Act of 198484 by unreasonably preferring
Carnival Cruise Lines' ships over Maritime Services,' 85 and by
unreasonably refusing to deal or negotiate with Maritime Services.86
Maritime Services further alleged that SCSPA's actions caused it to
lose profits, earnings, sales, and business opportunities.87 Maritime
Services' complaint prayed for the FMC to issue a cease and desist
order and to award reparations, interest, and attorney's fees. 8
Maritime Services also requested that the FMC seek a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction.89
The Federal Shipping Act of 1984 provides for two types of
proceedings in which the FMC may address complaints of alleged
violations. First, the FMC may conduct its own investigation and
bring suit.90 Secondly, the FMC may adjudicate complaints by
private citizens under § 1710(a) and (b). The FMC opted to
adjudicate Maritime Services' complaint under the latter
provisions.9
Because the SCSPA is an arm of the State of South Carolina,9"
SCSPA moved to dismiss the adjudication proceeding before the
FMC, asserting sovereign immunity as a complete defense.93
SCSPA also claimed that the Johnson Act9" expressly preserved
state laws that regulate or prohibit gambling in state territorial

80. Joint Appendix at 29, Fed.Mar. Comm'n (No. 01-46).
81. Brief for the South Carolina State Ports Authority at 4, Fed. Mar. Comm'n
v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S.Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
82. Joint Appendix at 29-30, Fed.Mar. Comm "n(No. 01-46).
83. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1710(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
84. See id. § 1701 et seq.
85. See id. § 1709(d)(4).
86. See id. § 1709(d)(10).
87. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1868 (2002).
88. Id. at 1868-69.
89. Brief for South Carolina Ports Authority at 5, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State
Ports Auth., 122 S.Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
90. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1710(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
91. See S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Conun'n, 243 F.3d 165-167 (4th Cir.

2001).
92. Ristow v. S.C. Ports Auth., 58 F.3d 1051, 1053-55 (4th Cir. 1995).
93. Joint Appendix at 30-31, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122
S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1175 (2000).
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waters and "permitted states to regulate gambling on vessels, even
for voyages outside of [state] territorial waters."95 The case was
assigned to the chief administrative law judge (ALJ)who found that
Maritime Services' complaint was barred by state sovereign
immunity and dismissed the case.96 However, Judge Kline
concluded that the FMC could continue to prosecute the case by
either initiating its own97 investigation or referring the case to its
Bureau of Enforcement.
Maritime Services did not take an administrative appeal to the
full commission, but the FMC decided, on its own motion, to
review the ALJ's ruling, ultimately reversing and concluding that
state sovereign immunity did not preclude it from prosecuting
private complaints.9" SCSPA appealed, and the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed the FMC's decision.99
C. The Court of Appealsfor the Fourth Circuit
In a well-reasoned opinion for a unanimous panel,'00 Chief
Judge Wilkinson traced the history of sovereign immunity and held
that "Congress simply cannot[,] .. .under its Article I power[,]
. . . subject an unconsenting state to an adversarial proceeding
brought by a private party."'' He based his reasoning on Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, in which he found the principle that
"state sovereign immunity transcends the type of relief sought,"'0 2
and Alden v. Maine, in which he found the principle that sovereign
immunity "transcends the forum" of the suit." 3
The panel rejected the FMC's first argument that because the
FMC is not a court, it does not exercise the judicial power of the
United States.'0 4 It relied primarily on Freytag v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. 5 In Freytag the United States Supreme Court
held that the Tax Court, an Article I court, exercises the judicial
power of the United States, even though it is part of the executive

95. Joint Appendix at 29, Fed. Mar. Comm'n (No. 01-46).
96. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1869 (2002).
97. Brief for the South Carolina State Ports Authority at 5, Fed. Mar. Comm'n
v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
98. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S.Ct. at 1869.
99. See S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165 (4th Cir 2001).
100. The panel included Chief Judge Wilkinson, Judge Niemeyer, and Judge
Howard.
101. S.C. State Ports Auth., 243 F.3d at 178.
102. Id. at 169.
103. Id. (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)).
104. Id. at 171.
105. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol54/iss3/8

10

Newton: Protecting Liberty Through Checks and Balances: Federal Maritime

20031

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

branch." 6 Therefore, although there are differences between the
Tax Court and the adjudicative authority of the FMC, the Fourth
Circuit held that "[tlhe central lesson from Freytag is that
adjudication by adversarial proceedings can exist outside the
context of Article III. ' 07 Thus, an administrative adjudication
exercises the judicial power for sovereign immunity purposes.0'°
Finding no compelling evidence that states were required to
surrender their sovereign immunity pursuant to the constitutional
design, Chief Judge Wilkinson opined that administrative courts
could not be used for an "end-run around the Constitution."'' 0 9
Also rejecting the FMC's second argument that an
administrative proceeding is not a lawsuit, Chief Judge Wilkinson
observed the FMC's proceedings and concluded that "[t]he [FMC]
proceeding . . . walks, talks, and squawks very much like a
lawsuit.""' Thus, even though an administrative agency cannot
enforce its judgment, its order exerts a coercive force similar to that
of a judgment so as to offend a state's sovereign dignity."' Finding
no other grounds for relief in any of the exceptions to sovereign
immunity,"' the Fourth Circuit unanimously held that the FMC's
decision must be reversed and remanded with directions to
dismiss." 3
The FMC petitioned for certiorari, which the U.S. Supreme
Court granted. The United States submitted briefs in support of the
S.C. State Ports Authority." 4 The National Association of
Waterfront Employers,' the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)," 6 Senators
Edward M. Kennedy and Russell D. Feingold," 7 and the United

106. S.C. State Ports Auth., 243 F.3d at 171.
107. Id.

108. Id.
109. Id. at 172.
at 174.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 175.
112. S.C. State Ports Auth., 243 F.3d at 176-78.
113. Id. at 179.
114. Brief for the United States, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122
S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46); Reply Brief for the United States, Fed. Mar. Comm'n
v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S.Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
115. BriefAmicus Curiae of the National Association of Waterfront Employers
in Support of Petitioner, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S.Ct. 1864
(2002) (No. 01-46).
116. Brief of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C.

State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
117. Brief for Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Russell D. Feingold as Amici
Curiaein Support of Petitioner, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct.
1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
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States Maritime Alliance Limited and Carriers Container Council,
Inc." 8 filed amicus briefs in support of the FMC, while Charleston
Naval Complex Redevelopment Authority," 9 the National
Governors Association and numerous other organizations, 0 and
thirty-seven states and the territory of Guam joined the State of
South Carolina in filing an amicus brief in support of SCSPA.' 2'
III. FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION V. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE
PORTS AUTHORITY

The question presented to the Supreme Court was "[w]hether
the Eleventh Amendment . . . or principles of state sovereign
immunity from suit preclude Congress from requiring the Federal
Maritime Commission to adjudicate a private person's complaint
that a state-run port has violated the Shipping Act of 1984. '' 2' First,
the FMC argued that other appellate decisions had held sovereign
immunity to be inapplicable to administrative proceedings because
they "do not exercise the judicial power."' 23 The Constitution
expressly authorizes Congress to regulate maritime commerce'24
and to prohibit discrimination by ports.' 25 Thus, the Shipping Act of
1984 (Shipping Act) provisions, having been in place since the act's
original enactment in 1916, are clearly within the constitutional
scope of congressional authority.'26 The effect of upholding the
Fourth Circuit decision would be to find the statute unconstitutional
as applied to private complaints against states because the Shipping
Act commands the FMC to investigate and adjudicate complaints.' 27
The FMC reasoned that, because Congress has the authority to
regulate maritime commerce,' 28 the mere form of the enforcement

118. Brief for United States Maritime Alliance Limited and Carriers Container
Council, Inc. as Amici Curiaein Support ofPetitioner, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State
Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
119. Brief for Amicus Curiae Charleston Naval Complex Redevelopment
Authority in Support of Respondent, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122
S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
120. Brief of the National Governor's Association, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864
(2002) (No. 01-46).
121. Brief of the States of Maryland, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent South Carolina State Ports Authority, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State
Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
122. Brief for the Federal Maritime Commission at I, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C.
State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
123. Id. at 11.
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
126. Brief for Petitioner at 12, 15, Fed. Mar. Comm 'n (No. 01-46).
127. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1710(b); S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n,
243 F.3d 165, 175-76 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he [FMC] must hear all complaints filed with
it ... [and] [t]he FMC had no choice but to adjudicate this dispute.").
128. Brief for the Petitioner at 12, Fed.Mar. Comm'n (No. 01-46).
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power should be irrelevant.129 The FMC also reiterated its argument
130
that an administrative proceeding is not a "suit in law or equity"'
and asserted that the "public rights" doctrine adequately protects
state sovereign immunity "by limiting the circumstances under
which Congress may authorize non-Article III tribunals to

adjudicate complaints." 131
Relying on Alden v. Maine, SCSPA replied that sovereign
immunity bars suits by private parties against states, "regardless of
the forum."'1 3 2 SCSPA further contended that, if administrative
tribunals, such as the FMC, could abrogate state sovereign
immunity, they would have broader jurisdiction than Article I
courts. 133 Reviewing the history, SCSPA noted that congressional
statutes authorizing private suits against states did not exist until the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) was enacted in 1964.13
Although a 1964 U.S. Supreme Court case, Parden v. Terminal
Railway of Alaska Docks Department,135 seemed to allow
congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity under FELA, the
Court had overruled it in 1987.136 SCSPA thus found a long line of
precedent supporting state sovereign immunity in federal courts.
Further analogizing to the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity,
which is also not expressly provided for in the Constitution, SCSPA
pointed out that the United States has successfully raised its
37
sovereign immunity defense in administrative proceedings.
SCSPA also attempted to show that administrative proceedings do
exercise judicial power and that sovereign immunity is offended not
just by the enforcement of a judgment, but by the mere fact that it
has been subjected without its consent to an adversarial
proceeding.3 8 Finally, SCSPA argued that neither the public rights

129. See id.
130. Id. at 23-25.
131. See id. at 34. The public rights doctrine permits Congress to authorize
administrative agencies to adjudicate suits against the government that involve certain
public rights. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582-83
(1985) (stating that "the court has long recognized that Congress is not barred from
acting pursuant to its powers under Article I to vest decision making authority in
tribunals that lack the attributes of Article III courts"). Neither the Fourth Circuit nor
the U.S. Supreme Court found merit in this argument. See S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed.
Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 175 n.* (4th Cir. 2001).

132. Brief ofthe South Carolina Ports Authority at 14, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C.
State Ports Auth., 122 S.Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 709 (1999)).

133. Id. at 13-14.
134. Id. at 18-19 (citing Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't., 377 U.S.
184 (1964)); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,744 (1999) (reviewing the history
of statutes authorizing private suits against states in administrative agencies).
135. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
136. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 683 (1999).

137. Respondent's Brief at 28, Fed.Mar. Comm "n(No. 0 1-46).
138. Id. at38.
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doctrine nor any of the exceptions to the sovereign immunity
defense applied to the case.139
A. Majority Opinion
1. The Hans Presumption
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, 40 first briefly
reviewed the history of sovereign immunity and concluded that the
Eleventh Amendment stands "not so much for what it says, but for
the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it
confirms."'' Turning to the first issue of whether an administrative
proceeding falls within the meaning of the text of the Eleventh
Amendment, he noted that, since Hans v. Louisiana,'42 sovereign

immunity has been applied to a variety of cases that are not strictly
suits in law or equity.'43 "[A]ttribut[ing] great significance" to the
fact that states were not subject to private suits in administrative
proceedings from the time the Constitution was ratified until
recently,'" Justice Thomas applied the Hans presumption that "the
Constitution was not intended to 'rais[e] up' any proceedings
against the States that were 'anomalous and unheard of when the
Constitution was adopted."" 4 He compared the rules governing
pleadings, discovery, and the role and powers of the ALJ in
administrative proceedings with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, concluding that the similarities were "overwhelming."'"
Therefore, he found that administrative proceedings should be
considered judicial in nature for the purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment and should trigger sovereign immunity.
Justice Thomas concluded that state sovereign immunity barred
the FMC from prosecuting private suits against nonconsenting
states.' 47 Such suits would be "an impermissible affront to a State's
dignity.""' Furthermore, he agreed with the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning that because Congress cannot abrogate a state's sovereign
immunity in Article III proceedings, it should not have the power to
evade this obstacle through the use of Article I administrative
proceedings. "'

139. See id. at41-50.
140. Justice Thomas' majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and

Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia.
141. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1871 (2002).
142. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
143. Fed. Mar. Comm n, 122 S. Ct. at 1871; see supra notes 38-44 and

accompanying text.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1872.
]d. (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 18).
Id. at 1873-74.
Id. at 1874.
Id.

149. Id. at 1875.
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2. Administrative Adjudications Indistinguishable from
JudicialProceedings
Justice Thomas next considered and rejected two arguments
that attempted to distinguish administrative adjudications from
judicial proceedings for state sovereign immunity purposes. He first
addressed the United States' contention that administrative
proceedings should be distinguished because the FMC's orders are
not self-executing. 5 ' In other words, the FMC has no power to
enforce its own order. Instead, it must bring an enforcement action
in a federal district court.151
However, Justice Thomas found this to be a "distinction
without a meaningful difference."' 52 He observed that a state must
appear before the FMC in order to contest the merits of the
complaint against it because, if it did not do so, it would be barred
from raising the merits in either the enforcement action or an
appeal.' 53 Secondly, the FMC may impose monetary penalties that
would accrue daily.' 54 Thus, he concluded that a state lacks
meaningful choice to refrain from participating in the proceeding,
and the administrative proceeding exerts sufficient coercive force to
be considered an adjudication.'
In dissent, Justice Breyer had contended that, because the states
have consented to suits brought by the federal government, the
enforcement action by the United States Attorney General does not
violate sovereign immunity.'56 He noted that the FMC cannot
enforce its own orders, and the United States must bring a separate
action in federal court to enforce the FMC's award to the private
complainant. In response, Justice Thomas opined that the U.S.
Attorney General's enforcement action does not retroactively
convert the entire action into one brought by the federal
government, particularly because the FMC is required to adjudicate
complaints brought by private parties.' He reasoned that this
procedure would fail as an exception for suits brought by the
federal government because it would not meet the requirement that
the United States must exercise political responsibility for a
complaint in order to bring it within the ambit of the exception.'

150. Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 122 S.Ct. at 1875.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1875-76.
154. Id. at 1876.
155. Id. at 1876.
156. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1883 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1876.
158. Id. at 1877; see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) ("Suits brought
by the United States itself require the exercise of political responsibility for each suit
prosecuted against a State, a control which is absent from a broad delegation to private
persons to sue nonconsenting States.").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54: 773

He concluded that the FMC adjudication exerted sufficient coercive
power to invoke the sovereign immunity bar on suits against states.
Addressing the FMC's second argument that administrative
proceedings do not present the same threat to a state's financial
integrity as do suits in Article III courts, Justice Thomas declared
that, while protecting state treasuries is an important concern, the
central function of state sovereign immunity is "'to accord the
States the respect owed them' as joint sovereigns."' 59 Therefore, he
found that the applicability of sovereign immunity does not depend
on the type of relief sought. 60 Moreover, the language of the
statute 161 makes it clear that the FMC's so-called "unenforceable"
reparation orders could, and likely would, be enforced against a
6
state in an action brought by the U.S. Attorney General.' 1
3. Compelling FederalInterest and Injunctive Relief
Arguments
Justice Thomas concluded the majority opinion by addressing
the two final arguments of the FMC, using the Court's holding in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.63 First, the FMC contended
that the Congress's constitutional delegation of power to regulate
maritime commerce demands that the federal government have
authority to regulate that commerce, including the authority to
authorize private suits against states to enforce violations." Justice
Thomas responded that the Court has held that sovereign immunity
extends to suits in maritime commerce and suits based on the
Commerce Clause.'65 As stated in Seminole Tribe, "Even when the
Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over
a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
States.' 66
Thus, sovereign immunity retains its vitality even when there is
a compelling federal interest for uniformity. 67 However, it remains
true that a federal agency may conduct its own investigation of a
state's alleged violation of federal law, either on the agency's own
initiative or based on a private complaint. 6 Additionally, a federal

159. Fed. Mar. Comm 'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1877 (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)).
160. Id. (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996)).
161. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1712(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ("Whoever

violates.., a Commission order is liable to the United States for a civil penalty.").
162. Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1877-78.
163. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
164. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1878.
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1878-79.
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agency may bring suits in its own name in federal district court.1 6 9

Therefore, Justice Thomas reasoned that the Court's holding does
not eviscerate the federal government's ability to prevent state
violations of federal law.17

Lastly, Justice Thomas rejected the FMC's argument that, even
if a reparation order were barred by sovereign immunity, the FMC
should still be able to issue injunctive relief, such as a cease-anddesist order. 7 ' Relying on Seminole Tribe, Justice Thomas
reiterated that the type of relief sought is irrelevant to the
applicability of sovereign immunity.'72
4. State Dignity
In closing, Justice Thomas conceded that the federal system is,
at times, inefficient and inconvenient.'73 Nevertheless, he opined
that the primary purpose of the federal government is not to achieve
efficiency, but to preserve freedom.'
"By guarding against
encroachments by the Federal Government on fundamental aspects
of state sovereignty, such as state immunity, we strive to maintain
the balance of power embodied in our Constitution and thus to
'reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."" 7 He
concluded that, although private suits against states in federal
agencies were not envisioned at the time our nation was born, the
Court's holding with respect
to such suits is the most faithful to the
76
design.
constitutional
B. DissentingOpinions
1. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens wrote a brief dissent emphasizing two main
points. First, he noted that basing sovereign immunity on state
dignity is "embarrassingly insufficient."' 77 He pointed out that
former Chief Justice John Marshall
had rejected this rationale in the
178
early case of Cohens v. Virginia.

169. Id. at 1879.
170. Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1879.
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1879.
177. Id. at 1880 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Id.; 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 406-07 (1821) ("That [the Eleventh Amendment's]
motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed
to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the nation, may be inferred
from the terms of the amendment.").
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Secondly, he reiterated Justice Brennan's argument in
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.1 79 Essentially, Justice
Brennan's argument was that Chisholm v. Georgia8 ° held that the
Court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the
State of Georgia, and that the legislative history of the Eleventh
Amendment revealed that it was intended to overrule the subject
matter jurisdictional holding, but to allow the Court to retain
personal jurisdiction over the states. 8' He argued that this would
undermine the state "dignity" rationale and would be consistent
82
with Justice Marshall's statement in Cohens v. Virginia."
2. Justice Breyer
a. ConstitutionalNature ofAgency Courts
Justice Breyer's lengthy dissent, joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg, decried the majority for basing its holding on
a doctrine not supported by the literal text of the Constitution. 83 He
began by noting that an administrative agency is "independent" and
belongs neither to the legislative nor the judicial branch of the
federal government." 4 Instead, agencies belong to the executive
branch and were created to execute and enforce legislative
mandates. I"5 In Justice Breyer's view, the FMC adjudication is
merely an "internal adjudicative process" by which complaints are
evaluated before proceeding to federal court. 86 Because Congress is
constitutionally permitted to delegate rulemaking and adjudicative
authority to agencies, and the Court has read certain safeguards into
the law to prevent abuses of that authority, he saw no reason to treat
agency adjudications as exercises of judicial power, however close
87
a resemblance there may be.1
Furthermore, Justice Breyer downplayed this resemblance by
pointing out that the FMC may allow hearsay evidence, resolve
factual disputes through "official notice," and decide the matter
based on rules that it has created.' Noting that any order issued by
the FMC must be enforced in an Article III court, he found the
agency proceeding to more closely resemble the executive power to
enforce the laws rather than the judicial power to resolve
disputes.8 9 Because Congress has the power to legislate pursuant to
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See 473 U.S. 234, 259-90 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1792).
See Atascadero,473 U.S. at 259-90.
Fed.Mar. Comm 'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1880-81.
Id. at 1881.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1881-82.
Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1882.
Id. at 1883.
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the Commerce Clause, he reasoned that it makes little sense to tie
the hands of the executive branch in enforcing these laws against
states.19°
b. Lack ofAnchor in the Constitution
Justice Breyer next attacked the Court's conclusion that
sovereign immunity is a constitutional principle. He asserted that
the Eleventh Amendment's text only prohibits private actions
against states brought in Article III courts. 9' He also responded to
the Court's holding in Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,'92 which found that the Tax Court, an Article I court,
exercised Article III power,'93 by distinguishing administrative
proceedings from the Tax Court or the Court of Claims. 4 Because
administrative agencies are not "courts" created by Congress but
extensions of the executive power, he reasoned that the Freytag
holding should be inapplicable." 5
Turning to the Tenth Amendment, Justice Breyer denied that
sovereign immunity could have been "reserved to the States" for a
situation like this because the commerce power has been delegated
to Congress and the federal government is empowered to enforce its
mandates. 6 Thus, he found no reason why sovereign immunity
should be preserved as a constitutional principle.' 97 He criticized the
majority's argument regarding constitutional design, noting that the
principles are abstract and that phrases such as "constitutional
design," "system of federalism," and "plan of the convention" are
not used in the Constitution itself.98
c. Argument from History
Concluding that the concept of sovereign immunity has no
basis in the text of the Constitution, Justice Breyer next attacked the
majority's argument by citing history. He first criticized the
majority for attaching significance to the 18th century silence on
sovereign immunity in administrative proceedings."' Because the
federal government may sue a state 200 and the First Amendment
grants citizens the right to petition the federal government for

190. Id. at 1883-84.
191. Id. at 1883.
192. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
193. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
194. Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1883.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1883-84.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1884.
199. Id. at 1885.
200. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1885 (citing West Virginia v. United
States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 (1987)).
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redress,2"' he reasoned that a private citizen should be able to
petition the federal government for relief against a state.20 2 The
executive branch is vested with the authority to enforce the laws,20 3
and administrative agencies are given broad discretion in choosing
either adjudication or rulemaking to accomplish their purposes.2 4
The executive power should be as broad as the legislative power.
Thus, he argued that the 18th century silence regarding agency
adjudications of private complaints should argue in favor of their
validity for Eleventh Amendment purposes.2 5 He urged that the
absence of agency adjudications in the early years of United States
history should not prevent the Constitution from being "flexible
enough to meet modem needs."2 6
d. PreservationofState Dignity
Justice Breyer next turned to the majority's finding that state
dignity required sovereign immunity.2 7 He again noted that agency
proceedings are not the same as Article III adjudications.2 8
Secondly, he argued that agency proceedings do not exert sufficient
compulsion upon states to merit Eleventh Amendment protection.20 9
A private party cannot force a state to comply with a law, and
orders of the FMC are not self-executing, whether entered upon a
private complaint or that of the federal government.2"0 Therefore,
the involvement of the federal government is necessary to give
authority to the action, regardless of whether a private party or the
FMC files the original claim.2" ' Next, he pointed out that if a state
seeks judicial review, its opponent in federal court is not the private
party, but rather the federal agency.2" 2 Thus, the Alden v. Maine
requirement that the United States exercise political responsibility
is satisfied because the federal government exercises its discretion
in deciding whether to initiate its own administrative proceeding or
to initiate an enforcement proceeding in federal court.2" 3
Conceding that the administrative adjudication of a private
complaint may exert some practical pressure on a state to respond
and comply, Justice Breyer argued that this pressure is an

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1885.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1885-86.
Id. at 1886.
Id.
Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1886.
Id.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (2000)).
Id.
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insufficient affront to the state's dignity to warrant protection.214
Citizens may exert the same pressure by complaining to Congress
or seeking a rulemaking proceeding in a federal agency.215 A citizen
may also request that a federal agency declare that a state is not in
compliance with a federal statute or regulation, thus exerting
political pressure on a state.216 Therefore, he saw no reason why
states should be entitled to special constitutional protection in this
instance.2" 7

Justice Breyer next addressed the problem that the relevant
statutes cited to in Federal Maritime Commission appeared to
preclude meaningful judicial review.21 8 He pointed out that the
Constitution requires judicial review, and a state might be entitled
to judicial review of an FMC order regarding a private complaint. 9
However, this question was not properly before the court.220
e.

PracticalConsequences

Justice Breyer also argued against the majority's holding from
a practical policy standpoint. The Court's decision, he postulated,
unduly burdens federal agencies by removing a necessary tool from
their arsenal. 2 ' Because agencies must now expend extra resources
to investigate and decide whether to prosecute each private
complaint, the result will be more bureaucracy and less efficient,
fair, and speedy enforcement of important federal objectives. 22
Finally, Justice Breyer asserted that the majority's holding
undermines the necessary structural flexibility inherent in the
constitutional design. He argued that a representative government
will suffer if it is stifled by the judiciary.223 He based his reasoning
in New Deal theory, stating that the Court should interpret the
Constitution broadly in order to give the federal government
flexibility in accomplishing its aims.224 It should reject "formalistic"
and "restrictive" interpretations that inhibit Congress
from enacting
225
social and economic legislation as it sees fit.

214. Id. at 1887.
215. Id.
216. Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1887.
217. Id.

218. Id.
219. Id. at 1887-88.
220. Id. at 1888.
221. Id.

222. Fed. Mar. Comm n, 122 S. Ct. at 1888 (citing Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898,959 (1997)) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting that states' rights decisions
have the effect of actually increasing federal bureaucracy in order to implement their
policies).

223. Id. at 1888-89.
224. Id. at 1889.
225. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

IV.

[Vol. 54: 773

ANALYSIS

A. Majority Opinion
As noted above, the crux of the disagreement between the
majority and dissenting opinions seems to center on the text of the
Eleventh Amendment. The FMC noted that the effect of the Court's
decision was to declare a section of the Shipping Act226
unconstitutional as applied 227 -a result not required by the express
terms of the Constitution. On its face, the Eleventh Amendment
simply cannot support the broad principle of sovereign immunity
upheld by the Court.22 The Constitution provides that the decisions
of the people should be embodied in statutes duly enacted by the
legislature.229 When the Court merely substitutes its judgment for
that of the legislature without finding grounds for its decision in the
Constitution, it violates the separation of powers principle.23 °
Therefore, the Court should refuse to strike down legislation unless
" '
clearly in conflict with the Constitution.23
When viewed in this light, the dissent rightly points out that the
Court must not merely recite that it has "understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
232

presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms.

Justice Thomas grounded his holding in constitutional history, and
a review of the cases from Chisholm v. Georgia233 and Hans v.
Louisiana 234 to Alden v. Maine23S does reveal a strong presumption
in favor of a broad understanding of state sovereign immunity.236
However, as Justice Souter pointed out, a mere common law
tradition may be defeasible by statute. 237 Thus, it is necessary for
the Court to find some justification within the actual text of the
Constitution for holding that the principle of sovereign immunity
extends beyond the express provisions of the Eleventh Amendment.

226. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1701 et. seq. (1994 & Supp. V 1999).

227. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
228. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
229. U.S. CONST. art. I,

§

1.

230. See FCC v. Beach Communications Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-16 (1993).
231. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
232. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1871 (quoting
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
233. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
234. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
235. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
236. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000); Alden, 527 U.S.
at 713; Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666,669 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 634 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996);
Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238
(1985); Hans, 134 U.S. at 18.
237. Alden, 527 U.S. at 764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Although Justice Thomas denied it,23 the Court's holding is

essentially a Tenth Amendment argument. The Court's argument,
which uses constitutional history, builds on the precedent
established in several recent cases, most notably Seminole Tribe of
239 and Alden. In
Floridav. Florida
Alden Justice Kennedy made it
clear that the Court's holding was based in the Tenth Amendment:
"Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as
sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment, which, like
the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was enacted to allay
lingering concerns about the extent of the national power."240
The Court may be loathe to use the Tenth Amendment to

support its holding because this amendment has proved to be a poor
defense against federal encroachment on areas traditionally
reserved to the states, particularly in regards to the commerce 24' and
taxing powers.242 However, the Tenth Amendment was one of ten
amendments that the American people selected from twelve
proposed ones243 as part of a compromise to allow the Constitution
to be ratified. 2" Therefore, the Tenth Amendment should be no less

enforceable than any other of the amendments comprising the Bill
of Rights.245
Then, it follows that the Court's argument from history, as
buttressed by the Tenth Amendment, runs as follows: a) the states
possessed sovereign immunity at the time the Constitution was
ratified;246 b) under the Tenth Amendment, the states retained all
powers not expressly or impliedly delegated to the federal
government by the Constitution; 247 c) nothing in the original
Constitution delegated the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity to the United States;2 4 d) although Article III could be
read to include the federal power to authorize private suits against

238. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1878 n.18
(2002).
239. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
240. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713-14.
241. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-49 (1985)
(rejecting the traditional government function exception to the reach of the Commerce
Clause); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("[The Tenth] [
A]mendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.");
See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,29-32 (1937) (stating that
the Tenth Amendment does not prevent Congress from regulating local industries).
242. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315,429-31 (1819)
(finding that states did not retain power to tax federal entities after ratification).
243. J.W. PELTASON, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 127 (Holt, Rinehart
and Winston 1979) (1949).
244. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833).
245. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-59 (1992) (discussing the
point that if the Constitution does not delegate a power to the federal government, then
it is retained by the states).
246. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
247. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
248. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1870 (2002);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716 (1999).
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states, a theory the Chisholm v. Georgia majority adopted,249 the
prevailing understanding was that Article III applied only to
existing causes of action and that the Eleventh Amendment
effectively repealed any extension of Article III jurisdiction by
Chisholm;25 and e) therefore, the federal government has never
been granted power to abrogate sovereign immunity, except by the
Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement power, 25 ' and thus the states
must continue to possess this right.
Based on this line of reasoning, the critical factor in
determining whether sovereign immunity applies is not whether the
Eleventh Amendment expressly prohibits it, but whether the states
possessed the immunity prior to the ratification of the Tenth
Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment merely confirms that
sovereign immunity is a state right protected by the Constitution
through the Tenth Amendment.21 2 Justice Kennedy has
convincingly demonstrated that the states retained sovereign
immunity at the time the American people ratified the Bill of
Rights. 2 3 Thus, sovereign immunity is established as a
constitutional principle not bounded by the text of the Eleventh
Amendment. 2 4 This is in line with the Court's broad reading of the
Bill of Rights.255 Because the Eleventh Amendment also serves to
preserve rights from the federal government, it should also be read
broadly.
When viewed in this light, the admittedly "embarrassingly
insufficient" state dignity rationale is unnecessary. 6 Furthermore,
grounding the sovereign immunity principle in both the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments resolves the problems raised by the fact that
administrative proceedings do not exercise the judicial power and
are not "suits in law or equity. '2 7 Because a quasi-judicial
proceeding under the executive power was "anomalous and unheard
of' at the time the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments were
ratified, 58 Congress does not have the power to create a right for
private suits against states because, prior to the Fourteenth

249. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
250. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11-15 (1890).
251. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
252. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779-82 (1991).
253. Alden, 527 U.S. at 716-18.
254. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 169 (4th Cir.
2001).
255. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1889 (2002)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 1880 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
257. See S.C. State PortsAuth., 243 F.3d at 173 (discussing the issue of whether
administrative proceedings exercise judicial power).
258. Fed.Mar. Comm "n,
122 S. Ct. at 1872 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 18 (1890)).
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Amendment, neither the states nor the people had ever delegated
this power to Congress.259

However, because the FMC is an executive agency and the
Constitution vests the executive branch with broad enforcement
powers, one should consider the question of whether an
administrative proceeding is sufficiently similar to an Article III
adjudication as to trigger the sovereign immunity principle. Justice
Thomas provides a lengthy list of similarities between the FMC's
Rules of Practice and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.26 °
Justice Breyer counters by arguing that administrative proceedings
allow hearsay evidence, resolve factual disputes through "official
notice," and use different rules of decision.2 61 However, sovereign
immunity applies to jurisdiction over private suits brought against
states.262 The fact that administrative proceedings have somewhat
more lenient evidentiary rules and decision-making processes is
irrelevant because these rules apply only after jurisdiction is
established.
Administrative proceedings can exert the same subpoena power
to compel a state to appear.2 63 They are presided over by an ALJ,
who has substantially similar powers to that of a federal judge.2 4
As the Fourth Circuit noted, an adjudicative body need not derive
its authority from Article III in order to qualify as an "adjudication
by adversarial proceeding[]. '265 Moreover, administrative agency
orders are often enforceable in federal court, and in the enforcement
action, states can no longer contest the merits.266 Hence, even
though administrative proceedings technically do not exercise the
Article III judicial power, they do exert judicial power against
states, at the behest of private complainants, for the purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment.267

259. See Seminole Tribe ofFla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,59-66 (1996) (overruling
Penn v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), which had held that Congress could

abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to constitutional provisions other than the
Fourteenth Amendment). Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment only with a "clear legislative statement." Id.

at 55.
260. Fed.Mar. Comm 'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1873-74; see also Brief forAmicus Curiae
Charleston Naval Complex Redevelopment Authority in support ofRespondent, Fed.
Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth. at 12-17, 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
261. Fed. Mar. Comm n, 122 S.Ct. at 1882 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

262. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.
139, 146 (1993).
263. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 173 (4th Cir.

2001).
264.
265.
266.
267.

Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S.
S.C. State Ports Auth., 243
Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S.
S.C. State Ports Auth., 243
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The executive branch is charged with the duty to enforce the
laws and may utilize adjudication to accomplish its objectives,26
but this is no reason to circumvent sovereign immunity through
administrative adjudications created pursuant to Article I of the
Constitution. The fact remains that either the U.S. Attorney General
or a federal agency may still initiate a suit against a state if
administrative adjudications cannot.269 Although, as a matter of
policy, an agency may be able to work more efficiently by
prosecuting private suits, 270 policy considerations should not prevail

over the text of the Constitution. Thus, if the executive power
cannot prosecute a private suit in federal court, there is no reason
why it should be able to do so in its own administrative courts
either."'
Considerations of comity and justice militate against allowing
agencies to have the authority to prosecute suits that are barred in
federal courts. In agency proceedings, the agency's attorney
prosecutes the case before an agency ALJ.272 These hearings are
required to be impartial, 273 but the agency may disregard the ALJ's
decision and proceed on its own motion.274 Therefore, an agency
decision has a greater potential to be biased. Additionally, great
deference is given to administrative decisions when appealed.275
The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency on questions of fact,276 and administrative decisions are
reviewed under the deferential "substantial evidence" rule.277
Furthermore, the reviewing court is limited to the record on appeal,
just as if it was an appeal from a district court. 27' Thus, the affront
to state dignity and a state's financial integrity are potentially
greater in administrative proceedings than in federal courts.
Moreover, if a state acted pursuant to a duly enacted state law, then
the result of an administrative agency decision against a state would
be to deny citizens of that state the right to a democratic decision on
that issue, seemingly without due process of law. Thus, the policy
reasons for sovereign immunity in Article III courts apply just as
forcefully in administrative proceedings, if not more.

268. Fed. Mar. Comm 'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1881 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
269. Id. at 1877 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

270. Id. at 1888.
271. See S.C. State Ports Auth., 243 F.3d at 172.
272. 46 C.F.R. § 502.223 (2001).
273. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2000).
274. Fed. Mar. Comm 'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1869.
275. See Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360,375-76 (1989); Santa
Fe Energy Prods. Co. v. McCutcheon, 90 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1996).
276. Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 542 (11 th Cir. 1996); see also

5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (providing the standard of review for federal administrative
decisions).
277. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992).
278. Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1875-76.
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B. DissentingOpinions
1. Justice Stevens' Arguments
Justice Stevens rightly pointed out that the "state dignity"
rationale, standing alone, is an insufficient ground for supporting
sovereign

immunity.279

He

also argued

that

the

Eleventh

Amendment only overruled Chisholm v. Georgia's subject matter
jurisdiction holding, "leav[ing] intact Chisholm's personal
jurisdiction holding[] that the Constitution does not immunize
States from a federal court's process."280 However, as noted by the
Fourth Circuit, Congress should not be able to grant broader
jurisdiction to administrative proceedings than to Article III
courts."' This would make no sense because Article III courts
review administrative decisions. The anomalous result would be
that federal courts would have no jurisdiction over appeals of
private suits against states from administrative proceedings, unless
a state consents to waive its immunity in order to appeal.
2. JusticeBreyer: States SurrenderedSovereign
Immunity by Ratification
Justice Breyer argued that the states surrendered sovereign
immunity in ratifying the Constitution by virtue of the Commerce
Clause.282 However, this argument is undermined by the fact that
the Eleventh Amendment was quickly passed soon after the
Constitution's ratification for the specific purpose of preserving
sovereign immunity. 2 3 Thus, any surrender of rights under the
Commerce Clause was rendered ineffective by the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments. Additionally, the fact that the states
delegated power to Congress in order to regulate commerce does
not automatically mean that the states agreed to give Congress
power to abrogate sovereign immunity. Because general federal
question jurisdiction did not exist in federal courts until 1875,284
private suits against states could have only been brought in state
courts. As Alden v. Maine confirmed, Congress has no power to
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity in a state's own courts.285
Thus, it is incomprehensible how the states could have agreed to
grant Congress the power to create a private right to sue a state
simply by ratifying the Constitution.

279.
280.
281.
2001).
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 1880.
Id.
S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 172 (4th Cir.
Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1884.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999).
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69-70 (1996).
Alden, 527 U.S. at 754.
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Because Congress was not given the power to abrogate
sovereign immunity via the Commerce Clause, it has no power to
create such a right by establishing administrative adjudications.
"[W]ould the founders have countenanced a system by which
Congress could have avoided all the strictures of sovereign
immunity by creating different tribunals where state sovereign
immunity was completely inapplicable? To ask the question is to
answer it."2 '
3. AdministrativeAgencies are not FederalCourts
Justice Breyer argued that the words "judicial power of the
United States" cannot mean "the executive power of the United
States."2 7 Once again, the fallacy in his argument is that he
improperly places the burden of proof on a state to prove that it has
sovereign immunity."' Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity
only upon a showing of "compelling evidence" that the
"constitutional design" requires it.289 As shown above, the Eleventh
Amendment, like the ten amendments before it, serves to limit the
power of the federal government, not that of the states.29 ° The Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments, working together to support sovereign
immunity, limit Congress' power to abrogate it. Therefore, the fact
that a right cannot be found within the actual text of the amendment
does not mean that it does not exist. For this reason, sovereign
immunity need not be limited to courts exercising "the judicial
power."
4.

Vagueness of the Majority Holding

Justice Breyer criticized the majority for basing its holding on
vague terms such as "constitutional design," "system of
federalism," and "plan of the convention."29' This argument is again
sufficiently answered if the Court were willing to ground its
reasoning in the Tenth Amendment. Justice Souter attempted to
counter the Tenth Amendment argument in his dissent in Alden v.
Maine by showing that the early colonies did not have sovereign
immunity as they did allow private parties to sue them in certain
situations.292 However, the fact that some states consented to private
suits does not mean that, in doing so, they also consented to allow
286. S.C. State PortsAuth., 243 F.3d at 172.
287. Fed.Mar. Commn, 122 S. Ct. at 1883.
288. See Brief of the States of Maryland, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent South Carolina State Ports Authority at 11, Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C.
State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (No. 01-46).
289. S.C. State Ports Auth., 243 F.3d at 172 (citing Alden, 527 U.S. at 731).
290. See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text; United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
291. Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1884.
292. 527 U.S. at 764.
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the federal government to abrogate their sovereign immunity as the
federal government saw fit. As noted previously, the rapidity with
which the American people accomplished the arduous task of
ratifying a constitutional amendment is compelling evidence that
they considered sovereign immunity to be an important right-one
which should be protected by the Constitution itself.2 93
5. Abrogation through Petitionfor Redress
Justice Breyer's next argument-that the principle that the
federal government may sue a state, coupled with the First
Amendment right to petition for redress, serves to abrogate
sovereign immunity-is unconvincing."' The right to petition for
redress was originally directed toward abuses by the federal
government and not the states.295 Although the right to petition has
been incorporated and applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment,296 Justice Thomas has recently indicated that the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment, applies with less force against states than
against

the

federal

government.297

Consequently,

the

First

Amendment right to petition may be treated similarly. However,
even if the majority does not accept this view, the incorporation
doctrine should have no effect on sovereign immunity.
The federal government continues to enjoy the privilege of
sovereign immunity without any explicit constitutional
protection.29 At the time Chisholm v. Georgia was decided, a
petition for redress was not the same as a suit.299 Although the right
to petition has since been extended to include the right to appeal to
the legislature or judiciary,"' it does not trump sovereign immunity
because of the Hans v. Louisiana presumption against "anomalous
and unheard of' proceedings.3" ' If the right to petition does not
apply to sovereign immunity in federal courts, then there appears to
be no reason to extend it to administrative proceedings in the
executive branch either.

293. Id. at 724.
294. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1885.
295. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
296. See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 543-44
(1963).
297. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460,2481-82 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
298. See Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 1993, 2001 (2002);
Walker v. Thomas, 678 F. Supp. 164,165 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
299. Chisholm v. Geogia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 437 (1793).
300. Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan Real Estate, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1124, 1131
(N.D.N.Y. 1977).
301. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1872 (2002)
(quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890)).
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Secondly, a right to petition does not automatically result in a
grant of every possible remedy. As Justice Iredell pointed out in
Chisholm, citizens have always had a common law right to petition
for redress. °2 As constitutionalized, this right is not absolute. 0 3 The
right to petition for redress is generally not distinguished from other
First Amendment rights, such as freedom of speech, in its
constitutional analysis.3" Allowing suits against states based on this
right to petition would also allow similar suits based on other Bill
of Rights provisions, eviscerating the Eleventh Amendment.3 5
Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment was ratified after the First
Amendment. Thus, if the American people intended the First
Amendment to authorize private suits against states, they rejected
this view by ratifying the Eleventh Amendment. Because general
federal question jurisdiction existed only in state courts at the time
both amendments were ratified,30 6 federal claims against states
could have only been brought in a state's own courts, and Congress
had no power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in state
courts.307 Thus, the First Amendment right to redress could not have
created a private right in abrogation of state sovereign immunity,
even if the Eleventh Amendment is limited to prohibit only suits
named in its literal text.
Although it could be argued that, by ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment, the American people re-embraced the right to petition,
thus abrogating state sovereign immunity, it is difficult to see how
the Fourteenth Amendment could have reinstated, in the name of
due process, a right which did not exist at the time of its ratification.
More importantly, Congress must clearly express its intention to
abrogate state sovereign immunity and must do so pursuant to the
enforcement power of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
protect fundamental rights.30 8 This was not done in this case.

302. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 437-45; see also United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875) ("The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful
purposes existed long before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States.").
303. See Kemp v. State Bd. of Agric., 803 P.2d 498, 505 (Colo. 1990) ("There
is no more of an absolute right to petition than there is to engage in speech.").
304. See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985) (stating that the
right to petition is "cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First]

Amendment").
305. This should not mean that states are immune from suit for any bad faith
violations of federal rights, such as racial discrimination. Private suits against state
officials for injunctive relief are still allowed under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), and the federal government may sue a state directly. Alden v. Maine 527 U.S.
706, 755 (1999); see also Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 122 S. Ct.
1753,1761 (2002) (reaffirming that state officers maybe sued in federal court to enjoin
violations of federal law).
306. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69-70 (1996).
307. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754.
308. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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6. Needfor ConstitutionalFlexibility
Further criticizing the Court for "attach[ing] 'great' legal
'significance' to the absence of 18th-and 19th-century
administrative agency experience," Justice Breyer argued that the
Constitution was designed to be "flexible enough to meet modem
needs.""3 9 It is true that the founders intended the Constitution to
retain its vitality over time. However, they also provided it with a
built-in adaptation mechanism by providing for constitutional
amendments.31 Indeed, it was through this very process that
sovereign immunity's constitutionally protected status was
confirmed. The fact that administrative agencies were unanticipated
at the time of America's founding should not give judges a common
law right to fashion remedies as they see fit. If Congress lacked the
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity and there is no record
of its even attempting to do so until the 1960s,3 ' then sovereign
immunity should retain its protected status through the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments until the American people choose to change
it through the amendment process.
7. Insufficient Affront to State Dignity
Justice Breyer also argued that the basic purpose of sovereign
immunity, which the majority defines to be the "preservation of a
State's

'dignity, ' '.32

is

not

transgressed

sufficiently

by

administrative proceedings to warrant its application. He points out
that a private individual does not have the legal means to compel
state compliance with the law.3" 3 However, this is also true in
federal or state court. In fact, a private individual may not sue the
federal government in any court without its consent," 4 so there is
no reason why this argument should have compelling force against
application of sovereign immunity in agency proceedings.
Secondly, the fact that a state's opponent on appeal is not the
private individual, but rather the agency itself, does not help
because the appellate court cannot review the case de novo.315
Review is limited to the record of the administrative proceeding in
which the state's opponent was the private individual.3? 1 6 Moreover,
an appellate court may overturn an agency decision only if it finds
that the agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious or not

309. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864,1885 (2002).
310. See U.S. CONST. art. V.

311. Alden, 527 U.S. at 744.
312. Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1885-86.
313. Id. at 1886.
314. Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 1993, 2001 (2002).
315. Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. at 1876 n.15.
316. Id. at 1876 (citing United States v. Interlink Sys., Inc., 984 F.2d 79, 83 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
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supported by substantial evidence.3 17 Under the substantial evidence
rule, the fact that the agency could have reached more than one
conclusion on the facts of the case is not sufficient grounds for
reversal."' Thus, even though the state's opponent on appeal is the
federal agency, the situation is unlike a suit brought by the agency
itself because a state's chances of prevailing are limited by a
deferential standard of review and the record of the agency
proceeding below.
It also cannot truly be said that the federal government
exercises political responsibility, as required by Alden v. Maine, by
prosecuting private suits.319 Although a court proceeding is
necessary to compel state compliance, "the FMC does not even
have the discretion to refuse to adjudicate complaints brought by
private parties."32 Additionally, the FMC can impose a civil
penalty of up to $25,000 per day against a state that is in
noncompliance with one of its nonreparation orders.3 '
Justice Breyer argued that, because an administrative
proceeding is not a court, it could not exert sufficient force against a
state to "affront" a state's dignity.322 But
[o]ne... could argue that allowing a private party
to haul a State in front of such an administrative
tribunal constitutes a greater insult to a State's
dignity than requiring a State to appear in an
Article III court presided over by a judge . . .
nominated by the President of the United States
and confirmed by the United States Senate. 3
Although other actions, such as legislation or a rule
promulgated because of a private party's complaint, also exert
practical pressures on a state, these measures are within the scope of
the constitutional design while abrogation of state sovereign
immunity is specifically prohibited in certain circumstances.
8. PracticalConsequences of the Majority'sHolding
Justice Breyer further argued that Federal Maritime
Commission v. South CarolinaState PortsAuthority's holding may
have practical consequences that adversely affect a federal agency's
ability to bring enforcement actions.324 However, this is not a

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000).
Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).
Fed.Mar. Comm'n, 122 S.Ct. at 1886.
Id. at 1877.
Id. at 1877-78.
Id. at 1885-86.
Id. at 1874-75 n.ll.
Id. at 1888.
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question for the judiciary. The separation of powers principle
inherent in the Constitution requires that policy judgments be made
by the people, through their representatives in the legislature, and
not by unelected and unaccountable magistrates.32 "If the FMC
needs more resources to ensure compliance by state agencies,
'
Congress may of course authorize additional funds."326
The
protection of our liberty, as embodied in the Constitution, is more
important than mere practical bureaucratic efficiency. Moreover,
the United States conceded that the Court's ruling "should have
little practical effect on the FMC's enforcement of the Shipping
27
3

Act."

Justice Breyer argued that the Court's decision in Federal
Maritime Commission threatens the necessary structural flexibility
of the federal government by unnecessarily limiting the powers of
Congress and the President.32 However, even a functional approach
requires some constitutional basis. The earliest case in which a state
entity was subjected to an administrative proceeding did not occur
until 1918.329 Although agency adjudications were subsequently
held to be constitutional,33 there is no evidence that the
Constitution intended the federal government to be able to exercise
this power against unconsenting states.331
9. Policy of PreservationofLiberty
Justice Breyer closes with a comment that appears to state the
basis for his entire position:
the Constitution's structural
requirements should be construed narrowly while its liberty
protections should be construed broadly. 332 It is true that an
overemphasis on "black letter" requirements can serve to hamstring
the federal government's implementation of necessary measures.333
However, this dichotomous, interpretive policy misses the primary
purpose of the Constitution. The founding generation believed that
liberty could not be safeguarded by merely a paper document. To
remedy the problems generated under the Articles of Confederation,
leaders such as Alexander Hamilton and James Madison studied the

325. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
326. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 178 (4th Cir.

2001).
327. Fed. Mar. Comm 'n, 122 S.Ct. at 1879 (citation omitted).

328.
329.
(1918)).
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. at 1888.
Id. at 1872 (citing California Canneries Co. v. S. Pac. Co., 51 I.C.C. 500
Id. at 1881 (Breycr, J., dissenting).
See id.
at 1872.
Id.at 1888-89.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407-08 (1819).
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history of prior republics in order to strike a balance that would
preserve both liberty and stability.334
At the Constitutional Convention, most of the debates centered
around the structure of the proposed union.335 The framers found
that liberty is best protected by separating powers and matching
them against each other so that power cannot be centralized in any
one individual or group.336 Under this principle, tyranny is thwarted
because each power jealously guards against encroachments by the
others.337 Many of the Constitution's framers actually thought
provisions enumerating rights were unnecessary because the
national power was limited to specifically delegated powers while
all others were assumed to be retained by the states or the people. 338
This principle was later constitutionalized by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.339
The constitutional structure, then, is not simply a nuisance that
impedes efficiency.3" Instead, it serves the long-term purpose of
preventing centralization of power in the hands of a few. It is for
this purpose that "[s]tates, upon ratification of the Constitution, did
not consent to become mere appendages of the Federal
Government. '34' State sovereign immunity preserves the vitality 342
and financial integrity of states,343 which in turn benefits the people
by preventing the centralization of authority. Because allowing the
federal government to circumvent its limitations through the

334. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 18, 19,

20 (James Madison with Alexander Hamilton) (surveying the structure and history of
the ancient republics of Greece and Italy and the confederacies in Germany, the
Netherlands, and Poland to conclude that inadequacies in government structure caused
the ensuing havoc).
335. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163-66 (1992) (discussing
various proposals for the structure for the federal government at the Constitutional
Convention); see also DAAN BRAVEMAN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE
AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM § 5.01 (4th ed. 2000) (explaining that the

founders focused mostly on the structure of government in drafting the Constitution).

336. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,457-60 (1991) (explaining that dual
sovereignty is an essential element of our federal system).
337. See THE FEDERALIST No.47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
338. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR ExPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 310 (Regnery Gateway Inc. 1986) (1859).
339. U.S. CONST. amends. IX and X. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The
enumeration of the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."
340. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1879 (2002).
341. Id. at 1870.

342. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.

139, 146 (1993) (explaining that sovereign immunity "accords the States the respect

owed them as members of the federation").
343. Hess v.Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,48 (1994) (reaffirming
that protecting state treasuries is the "most salient factor in Eleventh Amendment
determinations").
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creation of Article I courts would increase its control over states,34
the Court properly found it unconstitutional and dangerous to
liberty.
V.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court correctly decided that the FMC's
adjudication of Maritime Services' private suit against SCSPA was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment principle of sovereign
immunity. The Court wisely looked beyond the literal text of the
amendment to the history and structure of the Constitution itself, as
well as to the principle enshrined in the Tenth Amendment, to
uphold a principle that, although possibly creating some short-term
practical difficulties, ultimately serves to preserve the balance of
power between the federal government and the states and, thus, the
liberty of the people.
Timothy . Newton

344. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir.
2001).
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